Regulation

Regulation and Regulation, Then and Now

Regulation, Winter 2022–2023

Regulation magazine was founded in 1977, at an inflection point in the growth of regulation. Those of us who were present at that creation knew something big was afoot, demanding a commensurate response.

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Trump Rewrites the Book on Emergencies

Christopher DeMuth; The Wall Street Journal; April 18, 2020

Washington’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic is upending one of the most durable patterns of American politics. Throughout our history, national emergencies have led to a more powerful and centralized federal government and to the transfer of federal power from Congress to the executive branch. This time, the federal response rests largely on state and local government and private enterprise, with a wave of deregulation clearing the way. The Trump administration has seized no new powers, and Congress has stayed energetically in the game.

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Cost-Benefit Analysis vs. Regulatory Budgeting

Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 41–48 (Spring 2020)

This article is a commentary on Jim Tozzi, “OIRA: Past, Present, and Future, written by a colleague of mine at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the early 1980s. It reviews the evolution of White House/OIRA review of agency regulations under a cost-benefit (or “maximum net benefits”) standard and suggest ways of strengthening that program, including through the institution of a regulatory budget.

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Presidential Reform of the Regulatory State

August 2020 Draft; Hoover Institute Initiative on Regulation and the Rule of Law

This paper argues that the most promising approach to remedying the problems of the regulatory state is through unilateral presidential action. The idea will strike many readers as paradoxical. The “regulatory state” is commonly associated with, or even defined as, the consolidation of legislative, judicial, and executive powers in the branch of government headed by the president,[1] and we are accustomed to thinking that, in politics, the more power the better for those who hold it.  However, the president’s political interests frequently diverge from those of the agencies that nominally report to him, and he does have greater authority over their activities than anyone else. The presidency, I maintain, is the one institution in American politics that is capable of confronting the dynamics of autonomous executive government. And the personage who holds that office is uniquely responsible for confronting national problems that require assertive personal leadership.

[1] Christopher DeMuth, “The Regulatory State,” National Affairs, Summer 2012.

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Trump vs. the Deep Regulatory State

The Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2017

With some exceptions, and putting aside a few heavy-handed tweets, President Trump has proved to be a full-spectrum deregulator. His administration has been punctilious about the institutional prerogatives of Congress and the courts. Today there is a serious prospect of restoring the constitutional status quo ante and reversing what seemed to be an inexorable regulatory expansion. Consider three leading indicators.

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Agency Finance in the Age of Executive Government (with Michael S. Greve)

24 George Mason Law Review 333 (2017); http://www.georgemasonlawreview.org/archives/volume-24_2-winter-2017

Abstract

The rise of “executive government” has prompted a great deal of public debate and scholarly theorizing. This article examines one aspect of that very large subject: agency budgets or, more precisely, revenues. To an unprecedented extent, regulatory agencies have come to rely on non-appropriated funds for their ordinary operations. Many have become self-financing; some have become profit centers for wider executive exertions—and for Congress. We trace this development in two areas: agencies’ delegated authority to tax, and agency finance through settlement with private parties in criminal or civil enforcement proceedings. Due to a paucity of reliable data, our presentation is necessarily sketchy and tentative. We nonetheless proceed (with the appropriate caution) in the hope of informing a scholarly debate over “the administrative state” that to our minds has become excessively abstract and formalistic. Agency self-finance bears on many of the central themes of administrative and constitutional law: delegation and the separation of powers; congressional oversight; agency independence; the choice between rulemaking and enforcement or adjudication; and judicial review. Approaching the administrative state from its most pedestrian front opens a window both into its actual operation and constitutional rule-of-law questions.

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Regulatory Reform—A New Approach for the Trump Era

The Weekly Standard; January 30, 2017

President Trump has made it clear that economic growth and job and business formation will be his first domestic priorities, and that reforming taxation and regulation will be his primary paths to these objectives. In regulatory policy, his administration will be ambitious and results-oriented. It will focus on dramatic reductions in energy, environmental, and labor market controls; on easing permitting restrictions on transportation, pipeline, and other infrastructure projects; and on reforms to financial regulation to encourage business lending.

. . . .

The Trump administration’s regulatory relief ambitions will eventually require legislative collaboration. The Gingrich-era Congressional Review Act (CRA) may be used to dispatch a few Obama “midnight regulations” but is of little use beyond that. There is interest on Capitol Hill in enacting something like the REINS Act, which passed the House twice in recent years and again in early January—but REINS, like CRA, is designed for blocking regulatory excesses rather than empowering positive reforms. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which sets the framework for agency rulemaking and judicial review, is due for a major upgrade—but that will not help with the immediate priority of revising embedded regulations. Something more is needed for the task at hand. Let me suggest a variant of the REINS proposal, one geared to executive initiative rather than legislative reaction.

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Wireless Telecommunications Policy for American Leadership in the 21st Century

From Jim Manzi, et al., Unleashing Opportunity: Policy Reforms to Advance Innovation (2016)

This paper was written for a policy reform project aimed at identifying opportunities for removing regulatory obstacles to technological innovation. It recounts the history of Federal Communications Commission regulation of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum; shows how FCC regulation has fallen behind advances in communications technology, especially the development of wireless broadband technology; details recent FCC reforms—spectrum auctions, license liberalization, and unlicensed spectrum; and argues for a major next step—all-purpose spectrum licenses.

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Our Voracious Executive Branch

On the Nature and Causes of Executive Government

The Weekly Standard, June 27, 2016

Abstract

American government has assumed a new form. The federal executive branch—the president, his political appointees, and the hundreds of agencies that report to them—has come to exercise lawmaking powers that were long the unquestioned preserve of Congress. For decades now, the executive has made law through “rulemaking” under loose statutory standards such as “protect the public health.” More recently it has moved to sheer declaration, independent of or contrary to statutory law; this includes Obama administration actions on immigration policy, Obamacare, greenhouse gas regulation, restroom rules for transgendered persons, and other matters.

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Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?

8(1) Journal of Legal Analysis 121–190 (Spring 2016) (http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/1/121.full.pdf+html)

Abstract

Federal lawmaking has shifted radically from Congress to the executive branch and “administrative law” during the past fifty years. The shift has weakened the rule of law in important respects. Executive lawmaking is more specialized and flexible than legislative lawmaking, and is therefore less stable and predictable and more vulnerable to excess and corruption. It has facilitated the penetration of federal law into many areas of life that are better governed by private markets and social arrangements, and is relatively immune to evidence of policy failure.

Yet a succession of efforts to harness executive government to traditional legal and constitutional standards, and to confine it to tasks that are economically productive, have largely failed. The administrative state has instead grown according to an internal logic that is independent of considerations of law or economics. Congress and the courts have accommodated this growth, but with an important condition: as the price of wide lawmaking discretion, agencies are obliged to be transparent, to be open to the importunings of special interest groups, and to expound their decisions in elaborate detail. The upshot is a regime of lawmaking by ad hoc, non-electoral, managed democracy.

The administrative state has flourished primarily for material reasons. High affluence and modern information and communications technologies have reduced political transactions costs and multiplied effective demands for government intervention. The same developments have enabled government to supply the increased demands through congressional delegation of lawmaking to executive agencies. The agencies are relatively free of the constraints of the representative, conflict-riven legislature. They can employ modern technology much more effectively through hierarchy and specialization, and produce and maintain law on a much larger scale.

This “material” explanation differs from, and is more plausible than, the standard “intellectual” explanation—which holds that the administrative state is the product of Progressivism and is a considered response to the complexities of modern society. The material explanation suggests important constraints on strategies for reform. Several reform proposals are evaluated from this perspective, and two are singled out as promising adaptations to the dynamics of delegated executive lawmaking: a judicially reviewable cost-benefit standard and a fifteen-year sunset for major rules.

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Agency Taxation


Engage, Vol. 16, No. 2; September 4, 2015

In recent years Congress has delegated its taxing and appropriating powers to regulatory agencies under several guises. The new “agency taxation” is distinct from the economic transfers implicit in many regulatory programs and also from agency fees-for-service. Traditional electricity and telephone regulation has required cross-subsidized rate structures, with above-cost rates for urban and business customers and below-cost rates for rural and residential customers. Environmental, health, and safety regulations impose compliance costs that are paid by firms and their customers for the benefit of customers or the general public. And agencies have long charged fees for particular services and transactions, ranging from admission fees at national parks to FCC license fees and FDA and Patent Office filing fees. The subject of this paper, in contrast, is broad-based taxes unrelated to any transactions with the agencies, used to fund the agencies’ budgets and grant programs.

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The FDA Nixes a Pathbreaking Drug for MS (with Christopher DeMuth Jr.)

The Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2014

Alemtuzumab is used today as an intravenous treatment for a form of leukemia. But 20 years of research centered at Cambridge University also has shown that the action of this drug—depleting immune cells that become misdirected and attack one’s own body—is effective in treating multiple sclerosis.

Under the brand name Lemtrada (a product of Sanofi and its U.S. subsidiary Genzyme), the drug has been approved in recent months for treating MS in 30 countries, including Canada, Australia and all members of the European Union. But on Dec. 27, Food and Drug Administration reviewers at the division level (subject to a final decision by top officials) rejected an application to use the drug here to combat MS.

We are invested in Lemtrada through a partnership that one of us manages—and we still think the investment will do well. European authorities have called Lemtrada a “step change” in treating MS, and it will promptly become an important therapy at the intermediate “relapsing-remitting” stage of the disease. This is the stage when patients still have periods of normal life before permanent brain and nerve damage sets in.

It was sickening to watch the FDA deny an obviously effective and important therapy to those afflicted with a terrible disease. For as long as the decision stands, much needless suffering will result (and much needless foreign travel). The agency’s action is also a vivid example of the serious problems besetting U.S. drug regulation.

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Open Skies and Open Spectrum: The Occasional Power of Simple Ideas

National Review, June 15, 2013

Politics is the competition of interests and the competition of ideas. The advantage lies with interests that are organized and entrenched (teachers, farmers) and with ideas that mobilize effective interest groups (green energy, homeownership). Ideas that lack an organized constituency usually get lost in the shuffle, even when they are very good ideas.

But sometimes a simple idea can prevail over politics as usual, with spectacular results. That was the lesson of two Washington events earlier this year—one concerning a historical success, the other an opportunity before us today.

In January, the library of Congress hosted a celebration of the career of Clay T. (Thomas) Whitehead (1938–2008), a young White House staffer in the Nixon administration. The occasion was the library’s accession of Whitehead’s papers. This event, involving a little-known government figure from 40 years ago, attracted an impressive array of public officials, journalists, business executives, and policy intellectuals. Many brought their families. A panel of colleagues and academic observers told the story of a man of personal modesty and brilliant insight whose simple idea baffled the Washington establishment and revolutionized the communications industry.

When Tom Whitehead arrived in Washington in 1969, long-distance communications were government-protected monopolies—the Bell System (AT&T) for telephones, the three broadcasting networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) for television and radio. Telephone service, broadcast TV and radio, and the military all depended on Ma Bell’s terrestrial transmission system, which was well engineered but also expensive and inflexible. Bell labs had made important technical inventions, but the only new products anyone knew about were color television and color telephones. New technologies were cropping up—cable television, mobile cellular telephones, microwave transmission, satellites— but were being treated as appendages to the old systems. Cable television was long extension cords for delivering broadcast TV to rural communities with poor rooftop reception. Communications satellites were a government monopoly, COMSAT, operated in partnership with Ma Bell.

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Our Regulatory State

June 2012

Washington is in a regulatory growth spurt. Hundreds of rulemaking proceedings are underway or impending under the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare), both enacted in 2010. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is pursuing many hugely expensive pollution-control initiatives. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) wants to regulate the Internet. Agencies are tightening highway fuel-economy standards and banning the incandescent light bulb. Federal price controls, out of favor since the wage-price controls of the 1970s, are making a comeback in health insurance and debit cards.

Congressional Republicans are up in arms over these developments. The arrival of the Tea Party class of 2010 produced prompt moderations in the trajectories of taxing, spending, and borrowing, all of which require periodic legislation. But when it comes to regulation, legislators are kibitzers. They can orate and hold hearings on Capitol Hill, but the policy action is downtown, in the bureaucracies and at the White House. Regulatory decisions are based on statutes enacted a year, a decade, or a century ago. Many of those statutes give regulatory agencies expansive authority over broad sectors of the economy.

The Republican charges of overregulation are justified. The Obama administration’s confidence in central planning is as manifest in its regulatory policies as in its taxing and spending policies. The administration is comfortable with executive government, as in its dispensation of waivers to the ObamaCare and No Child Left Behind statutes, and its $20 billion compensation program for people affected by the BP oil spill (a program with no statutory basis at all). It uses regulatory authorities to pursue unspoken policies, such as hobbling carbon-based energy production (as in its rejection of the environmentally benign Keystone XL pipeline) and promoting labor unions (as in its campaigns to stop Boeing from building airplanes in South Carolina and to overrule state constitutions that guarantee the secret ballot in union elections).

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The Regulatory State

National Affairs, Summer, 2012

Washington is in a regulatory  growth  spurt.  Hundreds of rulemaking  proceedings are underway or impending under the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) and the Patient Protection  and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), both enacted in 2010. The Environmental Protection  Agency is pursuing many hugely expensive pollution-control initiatives. The Federal Communications Commission wants to regulate the internet. Agencies are tightening high- way fuel-economy standards and banning  the incandescent  light bulb. Price controls are making a comeback in health insurance and debit cards.

Congressional  Republicans  are up in arms, and their  charges of over-regulation are justified. The Obama administration’s confidence in central planning  is as manifest  in its regulatory  policies as in its taxing and spending  policies. The administration is clearly comfort- able with executive government,  as in its dispensation  of waivers from the requirements of the Obamacare and No Child Left Behind statutes, as well as in its $20 billion compensation program for people affected by the BP oil spill (a program that had no statutory basis at all). The admin- istration uses regulatory authorities  to pursue unspoken  policies, such as hobbling  carbon-based energy production (evident in the rejection of the environmentally benign Keystone XL pipeline) and promoting labor unions (demonstrated by its campaigns to stop Boeing from build- ing airplanes in South Carolina and to overrule state constitutions that guarantee the secret ballot in union elections).

Yet the apparent partisan divide over regulation is illusory. The mod- ern regulatory state is a bipartisan  enterprise: During  the half-century before President  Obama’s election, the greatest growth  in regulation came under  Presidents Richard Nixon and George W. Bush. And the Bush administration set the stage for many of the Obama initiatives that Republicans  are now attacking. Dodd-Frank’s policy of designat- ing some financial firms as “too big to fail” is a codification  of the Paulson-Bernanke bailout approach  of 2008. It was the Bush Treasury Department that first proposed a financial consumer-protection agency, and the Bush Environmental Protection Agency that first proposed reg- ulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. The Obama energy rules were authorized — and in some cases, such as the light-bulb ban, required — by a 2007 statute that President  Bush vigorously champi- oned. Only Obamacare is a distinctively Democratic departure.

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OIRA at Thirty

63 Administrative Law Review 3:101, 2011

Testimony on the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011

Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House or Representatives, October 25, 2011

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Conyers, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the proposed “Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011” (H.R. 3010), which would amend the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.

The APA was enacted as Congress returned to domestic business following the conclusion of World War II. It was a war-delayed response to the proliferation of regulatory agencies during the New Deal. Agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Communications Commission, and Civil Aeronautics Board combined legislative, executive, and judicial functions. That raised serious separation-of-power questions under the Constitution. The APA’s standards and procedures for administrative decision-making and judicial review resolved the constitutional questions to the satisfaction of the courts, and have served as the statutory backbone of federal regulation for the past sixty-five years.

The Regulatory Accountability Act would be the first major revision of the APA’s core regulatory procedures. It is a response to the dramatic growth of regulation and unusual number of controversial regulatory proceedings of recent years. Prominent examples are the Treasury Department’s and Federal Reserve Board’s aggressive regulatory responses to the 2008 financial crisis and, more recently, the Environmental Protection Agency’s highly ambitious rulemaking initiatives, the Federal Communications Commission’s efforts to regulate the Internet, and the hundreds of high-stakes rulemakings pursuant to the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Many of the agency proposals would be very costly—at a time when the economy is in the doldrums, business investment is anemic, and unemployment is high. Many of them involve statutes that give the agencies enormous policy latitude—contributing to the pervasive business uncertainty that seems to be weighing on the economy. And all of them cast Congress more as a kibitzer than lawmaker—Members can hold hearings, give speeches, and write letters, but the ultimate policy decisions are made downtown rather than on Capitol Hill.

Yet the current controversies reflect developments that have been underway for forty years: the migration of lawmaking authority from Congress to the Executive Branch, and the problems of policy substance and political accountability that have arisen from Executive lawmaking. These problems, like those that led to the original APA, are of constitutional dimension. Regulation has grown in scope and impact far beyond anything the framers of the APA (or for that matter the New Deal) could have anticipated. The APA has not kept up, and special-purpose administrative agencies have acquired an unsettling degree of power over our economy and society. The Regulatory Accountability Act is an effort to channel the discretion and improve the performance of the modern administrative state.

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Conservatism and Regulation

Unpublished paper, American Enterprise Institute, December 2011

In 2010 I prepared a paper for a conference at Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford, on American conservatism after the administration of George W. Bush. The papers were subsequently published in Crisis of Conservatism: the Republican Party, the Conservative Movement and American Politics after Bush, Gillian Peele and Joel D. Aberbach (eds.), (Oxford 2011). My paper was too long for a conference volume, so I cut it down for publication—“Contemporary Conservatism and Government Regulation,” posted nearby on this website.

I updated and extended the original paper, thinking that I would publish it as a monograph, but never got around to it. That is the paper posted here. It has had a bit of private academic circulation and been used in a few courses, and I have drawn on it in subsequent published articles. I like to think that its assessment of the financial crisis of 2008 has stood up well in the flurry of books and studies of recent years. The Appendix, which attempts to debunk that claims that the 2008 collapse was the result of the deregulation of financial markets of previous years (actually decades), is the only systematic treatment of the subject that I know of.

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Contemporary Conservatism and Government Regulation

In Crisis of Conservatism?, Joel D. Aberback and Gillian Peele (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2011

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy

House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, February 15, 2011

In the forty years since the Environmental Protection Agency was established, EPA regulations have imposed enormous costs on the American economy and purchased enormous benefits.  Some of the costs and benefits have been in the form of jobs lost and gained—the favorite political metric of economic impact.  But many other consequences have been important as well.  On the cost side, these include higher prices; the loss of many good things outside the realms of environmental quality and employment, such as the quality and reliability of some products and services; and an increase in the uncertainties and delays of the legal system, translating in many cases into lower property values.  On the benefits side, they include substantial improvements in public health; in recreational values and opportunities; in the amenity and aesthetics of life, especially in cities and industrial areas, translating in many cases into higher property values; and in the quality and diversity of fish, plants, and wildlife.

A simple but fair summary of the economic record of environmental regulation, based on a large literature of academic research, is as follows:

  • Environmental regulation has been one of the success stories of American government, producing large and palpable public benefits;
  • But it has been, in retrospect, much less cost-effective than it could have been—we could have achieved the same environmental quality at lower cost or more environmental quality at the same cost (or some or each);
  • It has generally become less rather than more cost-effective over time;
  • There is a wide variation in the effectiveness of EPA’s various authorizing statutes for controlling air, water, and land pollution; and
  • Based on what we have learned, we could revise the EPA statutes to greatly improve their environmental and economic results.

To understand these propositions and what might be done to improve current policies, it is useful to consider two singular features of government regulation, features of environmental regulation and also of many other programs of health, safety, energy, and economic regulation.  The first is that the costs of regulation are largely “off budget.”  Almost all of the costs of environmental regulation are realized in the private sector in response to EPA mandates (the agency’s budget is a tiny sliver of the costs of complying with its rules).  These very large expenditures, incurred privately but for government purposes, are subject to none of the political and managerial disciplines that apply to direct government spending—authorization, appropriation, budgeting, and taxing or borrowing to raise the funds.  In an era of hundred-billion dollar spending authorizations and trillion dollar budget deficits, one may wonder whether the formal spending restraints amount to much anymore.  Yet large spending bills, deficits, and debt are often front-page political controversies—they played a large and probably decisive role in the 2010 elections—while regulatory costs seldom receive equivalent attention.  The costs of environmental policies are, as a political matter, relatively stealthy: they take the form not of taxes or scary headlines about public spending, but rather of higher prices for private goods and services and foregone employment and other opportunities.  And these costs, while they may be estimated in the aggregate, are usually invisible to citizens and voters.  The higher prices are not revealed in the way that (say) sales taxes are, and the lost opportunities are usually completely insensible.  The exception is when specific plants are closed in response to environmental edicts—which is why such cases are so controversial and why EPA avoids them whenever possible.  Plants that are never built in the first place, or that slowly decline as production moves to other nations with less costly environmental rules, may involve equivalent costs but will attract little political attention.

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Rationalism in Regulation (with Douglas H. Ginsburg)

108 Michigan Law Review 877, April 2010

Legislative efforts were in the forefront during the first year of the Obama administration–but legislation is not the only way an administration leaves its mark. Since the Carter administration, assertive White House oversight of regulatory programs has been an important tool that every president has used to advance his policy objectives. Key issues raised by White House oversight–and the use of cost-benefit analysis as a guide to regulatory decisions–are addressed in Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health, by Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore (2008).

This review essay, published in the April 2010 issue of the Michigan Law Review, evaluates and criticizes Retaking Rationality’s arguments in detail. The essay addresses such questions as whether regulation has been notably different in Republican and Democratic administrations and whether cost-benefit analysis has employed “antiregulation” biases that have blocked or weakened important health, safety, and environmental protections. It also considers several contentious issues in regulatory cost-benefit analysis–such as adjustments to account for “unintended” costs and benefits of government rules and for the age and “quality of life” of protected populations, and the discounting of benefits that will occur in the near or distant future. Finally, the essay argues that White House oversight of regulatory policymaking is a legitimate and essential means for presidents to pursue their policy objectives.

Unintended Consequences and Intended Non-Consequences

AEI Bradley Lecture, June 2009

The idea that government policies have unintended consequences has become a fixture of political argument, indeed a cliché. One can hardly get through a day’s newspaper editorials without encountering it with respect to something in the news–the TARP bailouts, the North Korea bailouts, executive pay caps, local issues such as the drinking age and the driving age. “Unintended Consequences” is the title of many recent books–by Deepak Lal on the role of culture and politics in economic performance, by Peter Galbraith on the Iraq War, others on housing policy, drug policy, military history, technological change, a novel about gun control, even a Spider Man comic book. If you go to the blogosphere you will find almost a genuine google of postings based on the idea.

The phenomenon is a curious one if you take the term literally. Virtually every action of any consequence, private as well as public, has some consequences that were not part of the purpose of the action. If you attend a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute you may make an important contact but miss an important phone call or email. The human drama is replete with best laid plans going awry. Looking at things through the other end of the telescope, virtually every event has innumerable but-for causes, all the way to that Kansas tornado whose path is affected (according to chaos theory) by the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in China. The manipulation of but-for causation is a staple of time-travel science fiction. Why should it be interesting and important that a government policy had consequences that were not intended?

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Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review

Introduction of Associate Justice Stephen Breyer, December 4, 2003

Welcome to the 2003 Distinguished Lecture and Award of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. Tonight we are be honoring, and learning from, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer.

Economists and other students of government policy are often deeply divided on important issues, and their divisions are often highly correlated with their broader political views–whether they are liberals or conservatives, whether they vote Republican or Democratic. That is the case today in many important areas, such as tax policy and social security reform. It also seems to be the case over time with fiscal policy: when the Republicans are big spenders, the Democrats are budget balancers, and when the Democrats are big spenders, the Republicans are budget balancers.

Occasionally one observes a convergence among policy experts across the political spectrum that is a harbinger of practical policy progress. That was so with monetary policy in the 1970s and 1980s, and with welfare policy in the 1980s and 1990s. And it may seem to have been so with regulatory policy: The administrations of Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan deserve some of the credit for airline deregulation, but the lion’s share of the honors are due to President Jimmy Carter, his Civil Aeronautics Board Chairman Alfred Kahn, and, most of all, Senator Ted Kennedy and his then-chief counsel, Stephen Breyer, who were the architects of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.

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An Agenda for Federal Regulatory Reform

AEI Press, 1997

Federal regulation has grown dramatically in recent decades, whether considered absolutely, as a relative share of the U.S. economy, or as a relative share of the output of the federal government.  Businesses increasingly face an assortment of federal mandates and legal liabilities that dictate decisions about production, products, payrolls, and personnel practices.

The authors of this primer believe that the current approach to federal regulation urgently needs repair.  Not only are current expenditures mandated by regulation large, but a substantial share of those expenditures is ineffective.  As a result, more intelligent policies could achieve the same social goals at much less cost or more ambitious goals at the same cost.

This primer identifies six critical problems with regulation and offers eight concrete recommendations for regulatory reform.  We offer this agenda for reform in hopes of engaging legislators and policymakers interested in constructive action.  If Congress takes the lead in more effectively targeting regulation at the nation’s most important social problems, Americans can count on enjoying a high standard of living and continued social progress.

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Real Regulatory Reform

AEI On the Issues, May 1995

This article is based on testimony delivered before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 17, 1995.

Federal regulation has grown enormously in recent decades and is today more costly than all federal domestic discretionary spending combined. Yet regulation is subject to none of the institutions that govern and moderate direct federal spending. The expenditures mandated by federal rules are realized almost entirely within the private sector—they are free of spending authorizations, limits on available tax revenues, and review and appropriations by Congress, and budget control by a central budget office.

The absence of financial constraint is the source of many problems. These include the tendency of regulatory requirements to grow without limit in number and detail; the tendency of single-purpose agencies to be overzealous, extravagant, and sometimes abusive in the pursuit of their statutory purposes; and the tendency for policy to be manipulated and distorted by special-interest groups (including, of course, business groups). The problems are systematic, not the product of crazed bureaucrats or to one political party controlling the executive branch. Imagine if federal spending agencies were free to set their own spending levels and to assess their own taxes, with no budget control by Congress or OMB. That is approximately the situation with regulation today.

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Regulation Policy in the Reagan Administration

In American Economic Policy in the 1980s, Martin Feldstein, editor

University of Chicago Press, 1993

As Kip Viscusi stated in his fine paper, the primary goal of the Reagan administration in the area of regulation was to improve the efficiency of regulatory programs by hewing to economic thinking as much as possible.  Thus, this area of economic policy provides a good occasion to address the questions with which Martin Feldstein opened this conference, namely, Where was economic thinking influential in policy-making.  Where was it not, and, Why?

Let me begin by mentioning three reasons why regulatory policy represented a fruitful area in which to increase the role of economic reasoning in policy-making.  First, the regulatory agencies have an enormous amount of discretion in interpreting the laws, despite a common belief that statutory standards are very strict (and often so uneconomic as to make almost any economist shrink in horror).  In truth, the agencies are usually told in general terms to promote occupational safety, or pollution reduction, or whatever, and are then given great discretion in how they do so through particular regulations.

Second, as a sort of constitutional price for this discretion, regulatory agencies are required to be highly, and I think almost uniquely, rationalistic about what they do.  They must give public notice about their intended policies and draw a coherent connection between those policies and their legislated objectives.  Further, both the agencies’ decisions and the rationales that they offer for those decisions are subject to some degree of review by the courts.  Clearly, rule making can be a contentious and politicized process, and the rationales that the agencies give may disguise narrower or unworthy goals, but nevertheless, there is an obligation to justify what is being done in regulatory policy that is greater than that for monetary or fiscal policy.

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Plastic Populism

The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 1991

The congressional stampede—incited by President Bush—to impose price controls on credit card interest rates is the latest example of a new bipartisan populism in American politics.  The idea is to beguile voters with the promise that the government can reduce the price of some widely used good or service.  Why price is increasing is a question almost never asked.

The answer is usually straightforward.  Relative prices increase because costs of supply increase, and supply costs increase as a result of quality improvements, changes in consumer demand, or legal developments (e.g. expanded tort liability).  Price controls cannot abolish these relationships.  What they can do, and have done in an unbroken string of policy failures stretching back dozens of centuries, is to cause inefficient repricing of uncontrolled terms of trade, reductions in the quantity and quality or supply, and arbitrary redistributions of income among consumers and producers.  The Senate’s credit card bill, which sets the maximum interest rate at four percentage points above the IRS’s charge on overdue taxes, fits the pattern perfectly.

The supply of consumer credit is today a highly competitive national market.  Thousands of banks, retailers, telephone companies, and others offer credit cards.  (It is the individual banks, not Visa and Mastercard, that set interest rates and other credit card terms.)  The behemoth of the credit card industry, Citicorp, holds about 4% of the consumer installment credit market, and only three other firms (Sears Roebuck, General Electric Capital and Chase Manhattan) hold as much as 1%.  There is not the remotest chance that any credit card issuer could set rates higher than its costs of service, or could permit its costs to escalate without suffering a disastrous loss of business.

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Is Perestroika Possible? Advice from a U.S. Deregulator

Finanzmarkt und Portfolio Manager, January 5, 1991


The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its operations.
-Adam SmithThe greatest ideals are not worth a brass farthing if they are not linked with people’s interests.
-V. I. Lenin

Introduction: The topic of this paper—what the American experience with economic regulation and deregulation has to teach would‑be Soviet economic reformers—will seem presumptuous to many Soviets and farfetched to many Americans. I thought so myself when the subject was first suggested to me. After all, regulation is unique to Western economies and has no direct counterpart in the Soviet Union. It describes a situation where the means of production are privately owned and managed but where certain business decisions—prices, investments, entry of new firms, wages and benefits, and so forth—are controlled or limited by the government. The economic and political dynamics of Western‑style regulation would seem to be fundamentally different from those of a society where the government owns and manages everything.

I changed my mind, however, when I studied the debates over perestroika in the Soviet press and Congress of People’s Deputies. Perestroika is so far an elite project of a few Soviet economists, intellectuals, and reform‑minded politicians (some of them allies of President Gorbachev, others opponents who favor more sweeping reforms than he has yet embraced). A consistent theme of the perestroika debates is that while the need for drastic reform is evident to everyone acquainted with the performance of the Soviet economy, the political obstacles in the way of reform, primarily the interests of millions of government and Communist Party bureaucrats and managers whose jobs and perquisites depend on the current system of centralized state control, are so formidable as to make reform extremely difficult and perhaps impossible short of revolutionary upheaval.

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The Case Against Credit Card Interest Rate Regulation

Yale Journal on Regulation 201, 1986

This article analyzes recent proposals to regulate credit card interest rates on a national scale. The proposals are a modern chapter in a very old story. Usury laws—laws forbidding or limiting payment for money loans—are among the most ancient forms of price control. Like previous economic studies of usury controls,[1] this one concludes that they are unjustified because the supply of credit is highly competitive, and would be harmful because they would cause an artificial contraction in the supply of credit and other economic inefficiencies.

This study, however, is new and interesting in two respects. First, the proposals examined here are unusual. They have emerged following a period of rapid technological change in the supply of consumer credit and a related wave of state interest rate deregulation. Since 1979, most states have relaxed or repealed their laws governing consumer credit; the national proposals would reverse this trend in a stroke. Second, the removal of so many state usury controls has made it possible to observe directly the economic consequences of usury controls by measuring the supply of uncontrolled credit against the supply of regulated credit. This article offers such a comparison.

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White House Review of Agency Rulemaking (with Douglas H. Ginsburg)

99 Harvard Law Review 1075, 1986

Since the earliest days of the Republic, presidents have taken the steps they deemed necessary to maintain some control over the activities of the executive branch—to ensure that officials’ statements and actions followed presidential policies and were consistent with each other.  For example, President Jefferson reported approvingly that President Washington had routinely reviewed the correspondence prepared by his cabinet officials before it was mailed, a practice that Jeffersonresumed.[1]  With the growth of the executive branch, later presidents took more formal steps to maintain their influence over the executive bureaucracy.  In 1921, the Bureau of the Budget was created to consolidate all executive branch budget submissions.  Shortly thereafter, agency positions on proposed legislation were also routed through the Bureau of the Budget.

In the 1970s, growing dissatisfaction with government regulation led to formal presidential oversight of executive branch rulemaking.  This oversight function was eventually entrusted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) within the Executive Office of the President.  The same rationale applied: the president wanted to ensure that regulations were consistent with each other and with administration policies and priorities.  Modest initial efforts during the Nixon administration have been strengthened and expanded by each president who followed.[2]

President Reagan’s regulatory review program evolved from these earlier efforts and extended them in two crucial respects.  First, the initial programs directed agencies to assess the social costs and benefits of their rules; the Reagan program directs agencies to decide regulatory questions according to the assessments of costs and benefits.  It directs that, insofar as statutory law permits, agencies may take regulatory action only if the expected benefits to society outweigh the expected costs, and agencies must set their regulatory priorities to maximize the net aggregate benefits to society.  Second, the initial programs required White House review of selected rulemaking proposals and were vague about the prerogatives of agencies to issue rules over the objections of the president’s staff; the Reagan program requires White House review of virtually all rules, and requires agencies to reconsider rules in light of White House objections, while making it clear that agencies retain their statutory discretion and obligations.

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“Regulatory, Productivity, and the Reagan Administration’s Regulatory Reform Program,” in Regulatory Reform Reconsidered (Gregory A. Daneke and David J. Lemak, eds.)

Westview Press, 1985

I have often been asked to speak or write about “regulation and _____,” with the blank filled in with the economic preoccupation of the moment—inflation, unemployment, international competitiveness, etc. Here the assignment was regulation and productivity. But the request came when I was directing the White House regulatory review program in the Reagan administration, so I included a pitch for what the administration had been doing to make regulation more productivity enhancing. I also used the paper to expound on six concrete principles of regulatory policy derived from the abstract cost-benefit standard of President Reagan’s executive order on regulation. My colleagues at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and I had developed these principles from our review of hundreds of discrete regulations over the years; as my tour was coming to an end, I was using every opportunity to translate the cost-benefit standard into these specific policy dos and don’ts.

A Strategy for Regulatory Reform

Regulation, March/April 1985

In the modern state, to borrow from Oakeshott, we try to govern as the crow flies.  We imagine we can go, straight and free, from wherever we are to anyplace else.  When we set off, however, we are buffeted by powerful currents we cannot see and often cannot feel.  Outside the Bill of Rights, we (meaning most judges, public officials, and citizens) no longer recognize any formal limits on what the two political departments of the federal government together may do.  The business of governing has been entirely deregulated, so to speak.  Any faction able to organize itself to solicit the favors of the state is within its rights to do so, and indeed would be negligent not to.  This is a system that supplies the friends of liberty with an endless array of adversaries, as well as full-time employment simply resisting economic decline. In this environment, a strategic plan to make way against the forces of political supply and demand is about as likely as a strategic plan to make way against the forces of the New York Stock Exchange.

I believe the difficulties of acting strategically are especially great in the world of regulation.  Where taxing and spending are concerned, at least the flow of resources in and out of Washington can be measured and aggregated for purposes of political debate.  Budget and revenue figures are good summaries of what is happening in welfare, defense, or tax policy, and can be used to communicate efficiently with the general public over the fray of program-by-program interest-group contention. Ronald Reagan has mastered this strategy more than any other President, using general accounts of taxing and spending trends to overwhelm a host of narrow programmatic pleas and build public support for important shifts in federal policy.

In the world of regulation, however, where the government commands but nearly all the rest takes place in the private economy, we generally lack good aggregate numbers to describe what is being “taxed” and “spent” in pursuit of public policies.  Instead, we have lists—endless lists of projects the government would like others to undertake.  Naturally, the projects always sound worthwhile in the abstract—and, as I said, it is no longer asked whether they might nonetheless be outside the traditional or prudent bounds of government.  How then does one deal with the circumstance that the list of worthy projects is in fact endless, as is the government’s appetite for expansion?  Can one do better than to compile a counterlist and argue, according to the particular contingencies of each case, that many seemingly worthy projects are likely to be failures or worse?

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Is Deregulation Dead?

Presented at AEI, December 1984

This paper was prepared for presentation at a seminar on “The Political Economy of Regulatory Reform” during the American Enterprise Institute’s Public Policy Week in Washington, D.C., December 3-6, 1984.

The word is getting around Washington’s regulatory agencies, congressional committees, and law offices that deregulation is dying, and might even be dead.  The recently adjourned Ninety-eighth Congress turned a cold shoulder to the Reagan administration’s proposals to deregulate natural gas and loosen banking regulation, and it nearly enacted several obnoxious new regulatory statures, including one that would have slapped statutory price controls and discriminatory taxes on telecommunications markets.  This was a sharp reversal from the three previous congresses, which had passed a string of laws relaxing federal control of the airline, surface transportation, and financial services industries.  And the prospects for the Ninety-ninth Congress are discouraging.  Well-financed campaigns are underway to pass new or restored controls over the railroad, banking, and telecommunications industries.  No one knows whether the Reagan administration, preoccupied with the debates over taxing and spending, will get around to proposing additional deregulation measures, or will be able to stave off re-regulatory bills as successfully as during its first term.The regulatory agencies themselves remain, for the most part, firmly in the hands of deregulators.  But they are under increasing, irredentist pressure from Congress, constituent groups, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which has shown itself hostile to even the most straightforward deregulatory measures.  The agencies have been obliged to weaken or abandon a number of promising reform proposals, and several reforms that have made it to the Federal Register have come to grief in the courts (such as, most recently, the Interstate Commerce Commission’s decisions to decontrol the railroads’ export coal and boxcar traffic).

What is going on here?  Are we seeing yet another earnest reform movement running out of gas after a few fast laps?  The answer is no—not exactly.  When one digs beneath the won-loss records in the agencies, courts, and Congress, one finds a different and more complex pattern: a pattern that is reassuring in one respect, but worrisome in another.

The deregulation argument, as it emerged in the academic and policy journals in the 1960s and 1970s, and in the agencies and Congress in the 1970s and 1980s, was aimed almost exclusively at the three core features of economic regulation: government control of market entry, exit, and prices.  It is astonishing how far this argument has succeeded in the political world, sweeping away numerous price, entry, and exit controls in securities, banking, transportation, communications, and even some agriculture markets.  While no one can specify precisely how changing interests and ideas brought these policy changes about, one can at least enumerate the most important causes.

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Deregulation and Antitrust Reform

53 (1)  Antitrust Law Journal 189, March 1984

Traditionally, regulatory and antitrust policies have been uneasy partners.  Most regulatory programs permit or require coordinated actions among firms that otherwise would be antitrust violations.  This is true not only for economic regulation, which regiments price and entry, but also for healthy, safety, and environmental regulation, which regiment product design or production methods across firms.

In the Reagan Administration, we are attempting to reconcile antitrust and regulatory policy.  We have been quite successful, at least at the level of intention.  Economic efficiency is the keystone of our interpretation and application of the antitrust laws, and it is the keystone of our regulatory reform efforts as well.  President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 on regulation requires that all government rules be justified by economic evidence before they are issued.  The Order’s “cost-benefit” standard is often described as if it were some kind of accounting or arithmetic test.  In fact, it in an economic test.  We do not tote up columns of numbers and let the sum determine policy.  We ask why a government rule is needed in the first place; why private markets are functioning improperly; why liability standards or voluntary industry standards are askew; why entrepreneurs are ignoring opportunities for gain identified by government bureaus; and whether a mandatory rule is likely to improve, on balance, on private arrangements.

We have not always been successful.  Since the New Deal, the Agriculture Department has operated a regulatory program for certain varieties of produce under which growers get together, sometimes on a monthly basis, and decide how much of the harvest will “flow to market.”  USDA types up their decisions and sends them over to the Federal Register and the next day they are the law of the land. When the routing slip was changed to allow OMB to review these rules under the President’ Executive Order, we were appropriately appalled.  The Agriculture economists said not to worry; they had a cost-benefit analysis showing that, let’s say, withholding a fifth of the almond crop was good economics.  We said the analysis simply could not be right: enough was known about the workings of the price system to support a per se rule against such rules.  At this point, the Congress put an end to the entire discussion, passing an appropriations rider excusing OMB from reviewing marketing order rules for the rest of this year.

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The Chadha Decision and the Prospects for Regulatory Reform

Administrative Law Journal, 1984

In the months since the Supreme Court, in INS v. Chadha, struck down the “legislative veto” device in broad terms, commentary has focused on the resulting crisis in relations between the legislative and executive branches and on various possible solutions to the crisis. I believe there is no crisis and no need for precipitate solutions. I want to argue instead that the entire debate concerning legislative oversight of executive functions, both before and after Chadha, really involves a larger and more fundamental problem that cannot be solved through the mechanics of legislative vetoes or substitute procedures.

The rise of the legislative veto, at least as applied to domestic spending and regulating, is roughly coincident with the rise of large administrative state. But this is not just a coincidence. The legislative veto is one of a variety of techniques Congress has used over the past forty years in an effort to preserve its traditional policymaking authority from erosion—erosion due, ironically, to the very growth of the size and scope of the federal government.

When Congress considers whether to expand the federal government’s reach into some field previously the domain of the states or private arrangements—highways, education, medical care, automobile design, and so forth—its approach is to debate the merits of the individual issue before it, and then, almost always, to resolve the debate in favor of expansion. Congress almost never seriously debates, much less resolves, the larger problem economists refer to as diseconomies of scale. The term refers to the inherent limits on the size and range of activities any one organization can undertake efficiently, regardless of the abstract merits of the activities taken individually, and regardless of the energies and good intentions of the people in charge. Over the past several decades the number of activities the federal government has taken responsibility for has grown fabulously, while the government itself is still directed by 537 human beings, and is still the cumbersome and inefficient organization the Founders designed it to be.

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What is Regulation?

In What Role for Government, Richard J. Zeckhauser and Derek Leebaert, editors

Duke University Press, 1983

Abstract

The study of government regulation has emerged as a distinct field of policy analysis in recent years, yet it remains an open question whether “regulation” describes a distinct set of government policies—policies with features that distinguish them clearly from other policies.  This chapter considers several different conceptions of regulation that have appeared in recent debate and scholarship and advances the view that regulations should be taken as the prescription by government of terms of private transactions.  The arguments for this view are that it is more comprehensive and exclusive than alternative views; that it describes regulation in a neutral, functional way, free of insinuations about the purposes or consequences of regulation; and that it defines the limit of the ability of regulation either to redistribute income or to improve the efficiency of markets.
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The study of government regulation has emerged as a distinct field of policy analysis.  Beginning in the mid-1970s, leading universities established programs of regulatory studies, new professional journals devoted to regulation appeared, and several books on the politics and economics of regulation were published (Stigler, 1975; Owen & Braeutigam, 1978; MacAvoy, 1979; Weidenbaun, 1979; Mitnick, 1980; Wilson, 1980; Breyer, 1981).  Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan began a tradition of appointing experts on regulation to the Council of Economic Advisors and established several new agencies to evaluate federal regulatory policies.

Can the subject of all this study and debate by distinguished clearly from other endeavors of government?  The word “regulation” brings to mind the various federal “alphabet agencies” and independent commissions, such as the ICC, FTC, SEC, EPA, OSHA, and so on, and the similar state agencies, such as insurance and public utility commissions.  What these agencies primarily do is set prices, terms of service, and quality standards for particular firms and products.  But if these activities are regulation, then we cannot stop with the alphabet agencies and commissions.  We should also include the government’s sporadic efforts to establish wages and prices by statute rather than through administrative agencies, as in the federal minimum wage requirement and municipal rent controls.

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A Strong Beginning on Reform

Regulation, January/February 1982

Domestic Regulation and International Competitiveness

Presented at a conference at Harvard University, May 1980

I.  Introduction

Two perceptions join the debate over regulation in the United States with the debate over our declining productivity and international competitiveness. First, it is widely believed that the growth of regulation has seriously hindered domestic firms in competing with foreign rivals. Casual evidence for this view is that the newer programs of health, safety, and environmental regulation first began to impose heavy costs on American industry in the early 1970s, just when our productivity growth began to decline sharply relative to that of other Western industrial economies. Second, it is also widely believed that our major economic competitors, especially Japan and West Germany, have been far more successful than we have been in reconciling environmental (and other regulatory) goals with economic performance. This view is usually supported by contrasting the highly formal, protracted, and adversarial style of business regulation in the United States with the more informal, pragmatic, and consensual approach of other industrial democracies.

This paper analyzes these two views. At the outset, however, it must be said that the evidence on both points is fragmentary and that we shall therefore be left to speculate as intelligently as we can. For this reason it will be useful to begin with a discussion of some general propositions concerning regulation and economic competition in domestic and international markets.

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Constraining Regulatory Costs: The Regulatory Budget

Regulation, March/April 1980

This is the second of two articles in which the author examines approaches for constraining regulatory costs.  His first article, on the White House review program, appeared in the January/February 1980 issue of Regulation.

A variety of policies for constraining the private costs of government regulation have been put forth in recent years, and a few have been put in place. The most prominent are the executive branch programs, established by President Ford and expanded by President Carter, aimed at encouraging the regulatory agencies to pay greater heed to the costs their decisions impose on the economy. Under these programs the agencies are required to analyze the costs and benefits of major new regulations, and their analyses are reviewed and criticized by two supervisory groups operating out of the Executive Office of the President—the Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) and the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG). The regulation‑review programs have elicited numerous proposals for increasing the President’s role in individual regulatory proceedings even further—notably, by making the Carter program statutory and by giving the President explicit authority to revise or veto regulations after they are published.

The first article in this series reviewed the regulation‑review programs and the proposals to strengthen them. The article suggested that the unique problem of regulatory costs lies in the circumstance that these costs—unlike the costs of government policies pursued through direct expenditure—are unconstrained by systematic mechanisms of public finance such as taxation, appropriation, and annual budgeting. Of course, regulatory policies must be established according to the strictures of administrative law—notice, opportunity for interested parties to be heard, and written decisions whose logic may be scrutinized and rejected by a court—and these may be thought of as regulatory analogs to the budgetary restraints that limit the authority of program managers and grant givers. It is doubtful, however, that the two methods of restraint are even approximately commensurate, and the regulation‑review procedure seems poorly suited to closing the gap. For legal and political reasons, the review pro­grams stop short of requiring the agencies ac­tually to base their decisions on the results of cost/benefit analyses—requiring only that the analyses be performed. The review process cannot touch more than a small portion of the government’s regulatory activities or match the agencies’ technical and political mastery of any individual proposal, without a huge in­crease in the size and resources of the review­ing agencies. Most important, that process by its very nature cannot affect the rate at which regulations are generated, and thus their aggre­gate economic impact, any more than selective government jawboning can affect the rate of inflation.

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Constraining Regulatory Costs: The White House Review Programs

Regulation, January/February 1980

This is the first of two articles in which the author examines approaches for constraining regulatory costs. His second article, on the proposed regulatory budget, appears in the March/April 1980 issue of Regulation.

While proposals to reform the regulatory process are almost as old as administrative regulation itself, what is meant by “reform” has changed along with prevailing ideas about how the government should be organized and what it should and should not be doing. At one time or another in the past regulatory reform has meant, among other things: improving the internal management of the regulatory commissions and agencies, making them more accountable to the President (or to the Congress, or to the courts), and making them less accountable to regulated businesses and other private groups. The current regulatory reform movement, which began in the early days of the Ford administration and has gathered steam under President Carter, has been concerned primarily with erecting new institutional constraints on the costs that regulatory decisions impose on the economy. Before considering the policies and policy proposals that have grown from this conception of regulatory reform, it will be useful to observe how closely the idea of constraining regulatory costs parallels today’s broader political developments.

The late 1970s were a time of retrenchment in American politics. The “deadlock of democracy” which so worried political analysts in the 1950s and early 1960s—and then was forgotten during the post‑Kennedy years of heady legislative activism—appeared to reassert its grip. The present Congress is a “do nothing” Congress despite constant hectoring from President Carter on energy legislation and other matters. But this time around it would be difficult to argue that Congress is simply being unresponsive, since the public seems extremely wary of the government’s doing anything at all. The situation is exasperating, both to those who would like to press forward the expansion of the federal government’s domestic functions and to those who would like to roll back the advances of earlier political eras.

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The Regulatory Budget as a Management Tool for Reforming Regulation

(with Richard H. Sharkson, Eric O. Stork, and Arthur Wright)

Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, May 1979

Introduction

Regulation is one method by which the Federal government claims resources to achieve its goals. The share of the nation’s resources claimed by regulation has grown rapidly in recent years.At present, there are only weak constraints on the government’s use of resources through regulation, and there is no procedure for incorporating the full cost of regulation into government decisionmaking.  A system for budgeting regulatory compliance costs has significant potential as a management tool for controlling and shaping the economic impact of Federal regulation.

Although on strictly legal grounds it might be possible to establish a regulatory budget system by administrative action, the political importance of such a system suggests that it should be established by legislation.  There appear to be no constitutional barriers to including the so-called independent regulatory commissions in a regulatory budget system, along with the regulatory agencies in the executive branch.  The organization and management of a regulatory budget system could be similar to that currently utilized for the fiscal budget.  Enforcement of regulatory budget ceilings would pose no unusual problems.  For start-up it would appear expedient to focus on the compliance costs of new and revised regulations.  Coverage of existing regulations could be added subsequently.

Without estimates of the cost of regulation there could be no regulatory budget.  While existing methods of cost estimation need improvement, the very existence of a regulatory budget system would stimulate new or improved methods.  Use of a methodology recently developed by Arthur Andersen and Co. could at acceptable cost provide the precise, consistent, and transparent estimates of compliance costs that would be required for a workable regulatory budget.

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The FTC’s Tantrum Against Children’s Television

The American Spectator, April 1979

Author’s Note: On February 24, 1978, the Federal Trade Commission published a 346-page staff report advocating, among other things, a federal ban on television advertising directed at children who are less than eight years old.  The other proposals included a ban on television advertising of highly sugared foods to children under twelve years of age and (alternatively) a requirement that advertisers of highly sugared foods finance “counter advertisements” prepared by public-interest groups selected by the FTC.  The report did not say how, in the absence of advertising, children’s television programs would be financed, but some of the petitioners who had instigated the FTC study suggested that children’s programs should be considered a “public responsibility” of television broadcasters or of manufacturers of children’s products.  In any event, on the same day it published the Staff Report, the FTC began a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether it should issue regulations implementing the Report’s recommendations.

The idea of doing something about television commercials directed at children had been percolating at the Commission for several years, but it was espoused with such vehemence by the Commission’s new chairman, Michael Pertschuk, that in late 1978 he was disqualified from participating in the rulemaking proceeding by a federal court, on the grounds that he had “prejudged” the merits of the case.  Outside the Commission the Staff Report and rulemaking proceeding were greeted with considerable enthusiasm by a variety of consumerist organizations—which was surprising, at least on the fact of it, since the proposed bans would be aimed explicitly at reducing the information and hence choices available to consumers, and would almost certainly result in higher prices for children’s products.  At the same time, however, a number of organizations usually sympathetic to consumer-protection regulation were highly critical of the FTC proceeding.  The Washington Post, for example, in an editorial that came to be widely quoted, described the action as “a preposterous intervention that could turn the agency into a great national nanny.”

Toward the end of the year I was asked by an executive in the toy industry (which advertises heavily on children’s television shows) to address the annual meeting of the industry’s trade association on the subject of the proposed ban.  They had done most of the research, he told me, on the First Amendment objections to the ban, on the probable effects of the ban on the price of toys and the financing of commercial children’s programming, and on other matters necessary to argue their case before the Commission.  They did not wish to hear a recitation of the views they already held. What they did wish to hear was some explanation of why this was happening to them, and of how the FTC’s proposal fit into the general trend of increasing government control of the economic life of the nation.

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Defending Consumers Against Regulation

The American Spectator, January 1978

When President Carter was an obscure candidate in the wilds of New Hampshire, he began to attract attention and support with his fervent promises to slim down the federal bureaucracy.  Having settled comfortably in Washington, he proposed the creation of two new federal agencies and succeeded in creating one (the Department of Energy) during his first year in office.  This performance followed perfectly the precedent of Presidents Nixon and Ford, whose theoretical aversion to big government was even more emphatic than President Carter’s, and who managed to establish eight major agencies in as many years without being seriously brought to account for it.  (My figure does not include the Plumbers Bureau.)

My concern here is with the agency President Carter has so far failed to establish but which, I predict, he will secure in fulfillment of his second-year quote.  This is the Agency for Consumer Advocacy, which bade fair to pass the Congress last spring, but which was temporarily defeated through the opposition of business groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce, and practically all political conservatives.  I should like to argue that the Consumer Advocacy proposal is potentially the most strategically sound “regulatory reform” yet conceived, and that the uncompromising opposition of conservatives, businessmen, and others who wish to reduce the scope of political fiddling in the economic marketplace, was mistaken.  An understandable mistake, given the confusion surrounding the debates over “consumer advocacy” and “regulatory reform,” but one which promises unhappy consequences when the proposal finally becomes law.

The terms “consumer advocacy” and “consumer interest” have acquired a bad odor among businessmen and conservatives in recent years because of the association of these terms with the splurge of new health, safety, and environmental laws.  At a formal level, the rationale of these laws has been that they correct various “market failures,” such as the social costs of pollution, which a firm may ignore in the absence of legislation or common-law liability.  But these laws have also been, in varying degrees, hostile toward traditional business values and paternalistic toward the consumer.  In all they have enormously increased the costs and uncertainties of doing business, and have played an important role in propelling the young lawyers and civil servants of the “new class” to positions of social leadership and prestige once held by business managers themselves.  To many businessmen beleaguered by these developments, “regulatory reform” has come to mean a counterrevolution against the consumer movement which would, at the very least, teach the “new class” good business manners: that regulations must take account of costs as well as benefits, and must be precise and predictable enough to restore a degree of confidence to the business decisions they affect.

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